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CAN SURVEY PARTICIPATION ALTER HOUSEHOLD
SAVING BEHAVIOUR?*
Thomas F. Crossley, Jochem de Bresser, Liam Delaney and Joachim Winter
We document an effect of survey participation on household saving. Identification comes from
random assignment to modules within a population-representative Internet panel. The saving
measure is based on linked administrative wealth data. Households that responded to a detailed
questionnaire on needs in retirement reduced their non-housing saving rate by 3.5 percentage
points, on a base of 1.5%. The survey may have acted as a salience shock, possibly with respect to
reduced housing costs in retirement. Our findings present an important challenge to survey
designers. They also add to the evidence of limited attention in household financial decision making.
Much empirical research in economics analyses data from surveys of individuals and
households. The development of panel surveys has allowed researchers to assess and
account for heterogeneity and dynamics in economic behaviour. However, repeated
data collection from the same individuals or households brings a risk of ‘survey effects’
– the possibility that questioning individuals about their actions or attitudes in a
particular domain can alter their later behaviour. Finding significant survey effects in
important areas of economic research would require a rethinking of data collection
strategies. More positively, finding such effects might also provide insight into the
cognitive processes underlying broader economic behaviour.
In this article, we test for survey effects in a central domain of economic research:
household saving behaviour. In particular, we test whether being asked questions
about retirement income needs leads to changes in household saving behaviour.
Recent work in behavioural finance suggests possible mechanisms for survey effects on
saving behaviour. Limited attention means that individuals tend to overlook some of
the consequences of their decisions (DellaVigna, 2009). If those unnoticed conse-
quences materialise in the future, as do the benefits of saving today, this results in
biases that are similar to those induced by limited self-control (Karlan et al., 2012).
However, in contrast to self-control problems, limited attention suggests that behaviour
might be corrected by focusing individuals’ attention on the aspects they are missing.
For example, recent literature suggests that sending out mailings can induce desired
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behaviour (such as tax compliance or personal care) cost effectively (Fellner et al.,
2013; Altmann and Traxler, 2014; Hallsworth et al., 2014). To the extent that surveys
on retirement planning can direct participants’ attention, they may have behavioural
effects, though the direction of such effects is not clear a priori.
Our research design has a number of critical features. First, we study survey effects in
a large representative survey of a developed country population (the Netherlands).
Second, we study effects on a key life-cycle choice: the level of savings. Third, the
randomised allocation of members of an Internet panel to a survey module on
retirement income needs provides for clean identification of the causal effect of
participating in that survey module. Fourth, we measure household saving with linked
administrative data – not with responses in subsequent panel surveys. This allows us to
rule out the possibility that any observed effect is on reporting, rather than on the
underlying saving behaviour. No prior study combines all these attributes.
In an environment in which public and occupational pension schemes implied high
income replacement rates in retirement (the Netherlands in 2008), we find robust
evidence that exposure to the retirement needs module subsequently led to lower
average household saving. This mean effect is driven by older and more educated
households. These households have the highest expected pension wealth and higher
housing wealth. They are also much more likely, in the survey, to report that their
housing costs will fall in retirement (perhaps because they anticipate paying off their
mortgage debt). Our interpretation is that the survey module directed attention to
aspects of retirement preparedness and needs that were not otherwise salient and, for
wealthy households, this apparently implied that they should save less.
The surveymethods literature has long been concerned with ‘panel conditioning’: the
way in which experience in a panel survey affects subjects’ responses. Several studies have
examined panel conditioning in domains such as subjective well-being (Van Lan-
deghem, 2014), marital satisfaction (Glenn, 1998), and preferences (Binswanger et al.,
2013). Much of this literature compares experienced panel members with refreshment
samples or other novice respondents. As pointed out by Das et al. (2011), disentangling
panel conditioning from unobserved factors influencing attrition is a complex task. Das
et al. (2011) conclude that, after controlling for unobserved attrition factors, there are
significant panel conditioning effects in knowledge questions but not in other types of
questions.1Our design, based on random invitations to a surveymodule, avoids concerns
about attrition as well as age and time effects. In a recent review paper, Warren and
Halpern-Manners (2012) note that the survey research literature on panel conditioning
generally failed to employ randomised designs. They also point out that to date, there is
little systematic evidence on panel conditioning in large-scale longitudinal social science
surveys. Our article addresses this concern as well.
The psychology and marketing literatures have documented a number of related
behavioural phenomena. The ‘question-behaviour effect’ refers to the observation that
1 Das et al. (2011) consider a range of questions related to knowledge and behaviour, food choice,
attitudes towards immigration, and pensions. The only questions that are related to the present article
concern knowledge and expectations with respect to pensions. Generally, they do not find evidence of panel
conditioning for those questions, with one exception, a knowledge question about a specific institutional
feature of the Dutch pension system.
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asking respondents to predict future behaviour results in more of the behaviour under
consideration (Dholakia, 2010). For example, Spangenberg (1997) shows that asking
people to predict their workout behaviour induces them to visit the gym more often.
Where the behaviour in question is normatively desirable this is sometimes called the
‘self-prophecy effect’ (Sherman, 1980), and where it is normatively ambiguous, the
‘mere measurement effect’ (Morwitz et al., 1993). Several papers have also shown that
surveying people about risky behaviours can increase the propensity to engage in those
behaviours (Fitzsimons and Shiv, 2001; Fitzsimons and Moore, 2008; Dholakia, 2010).
The public health literature reports some evidence that supports the use of self-
recording of behaviour as a behavioural change intervention (Burke et al., 2011;
Michie et al., 2011a, b), though recently Axinn et al. (2015) found little evidence of
behavioural effects of keeping survey diaries of sexual behaviour for extended periods
(up to 30 months).
The effects documented in these literatures connect questions about the intention to,
or likelihoodof, engaging in specific behaviour, or the recordingof specific behaviour, to
thepropensity to engage in that behaviour. The survey effects that we study are less direct.
We investigate the effect of being surveyed about topics related to the behaviour of
interest, rather than direct questions about that behaviour. The question module that is
our treatment has no specific questions about saving behaviour.
Two further relevant studies are Zwane et al. (2011) and Stango and Zinman (2014).
Like us they consider survey effects that result from being surveyed on a topic related
to the behaviour of interest, rather than from direct questions about that behaviour, or
self-recording of that behaviour. Furthermore, they use administrative data to measure
outcomes, in order to isolate genuine changes in behaviour from changes in reporting
style. Zwane et al. (2011) study the effect of randomly assigning subjects to extra survey
monitoring in the context of five randomised controlled trials of interventions in
developing countries. They find that survey monitoring significantly increases the
probability of water treatment product usage and medical insurance usage. They do
not find effects for micro-lending take-up or renewal. Stango and Zinman (2014) show
that participants in a marketing research panel that enter a survey with general
questions about overdrafts and overdrafts fees are less likely to incur such fees in the
same month, and in subsequent months. Their interpretation is that the surveys with
overdraft questions act as ‘salience shocks’ which help respondents avoid costs arising
from limited attention.
Our article differs from Zwane et al. (2011) and Stango and Zinman (2014) in that
the analysis is based on a large population-representative survey used by social science
researchers and that the survey effects we study concern a central life-cycle choice – the
level of saving. It may be much more difficult to shift choices of important real
quantities like consumption, saving or labour supply, than it is to induce small changes
in the timing of transactions or portfolio composition, or to encourage the avoidance
of fees. To our knowledge, there is no prior evidence on survey effects on core life-cycle
choices like the level of savings or consumption. Our analysis further differs from
Zwane et al. (2011), in that the data are drawn from a developed economy, and from
Stango and Zinman (2014) in having a randomised design.
Our findings present a significant challenge to survey designers and to the collection
of longitudinal data in general and data on the important economic topics of saving
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behaviour and retirement preparation in particular. Measurement is not innocuous.
Even a random sample of a population, which has not been subject to non-random
attrition, can fail to be representative of the population under study if the act of
measurement alters the behaviour of sample members. More positively, this study
demonstrates the value of randomised survey content in allowing for the exploration of
such effects.
Our results also significantly extend the evidence base for the importance of limited
attention in household financial decision making (Karlan et al., 2012; Stango and
Zinman, 2014). We show that survey questions can alter choices with respect to a key
life-cycle variable, the overall level of saving. Our findings also demonstrate that
salience shocks can shift behaviour in different directions, depending on the context.
While Karlan et al. (2012) find that deliberate and targeted reminders raise
contributions to goal-specific savings accounts in Bolivia, Peru and the Philippines,
we find that exposure to a module of questions about retirement income needs
lowered overall saving in the Netherlands. We also find quite different patterns of
effect heterogeneity. While Stango and Zinman (2014) find larger effects of being
surveyed among lower-educated subjects, we find the largest effects among the high-
education group. We discuss this further below.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the institutional
context of our study. Section 2 describes the research design, data and methods. In
Section 3, we present the main results as well as a number of robustness checks and
falsification tests. Section 4 concludes.
1. Institutional Context
Active saving will reflect the economic circumstances that households face and so to
interpret the results that follow, some background is required. The Dutch pension
system in 2008 was characterised by arrangements that were almost universal and
provided extremely generous income replacement.
The Dutch system of income provision during retirement consists of four categories
or ‘pillars’. The first pillar is that of the public pension, which provides anyone who
lived in the Netherlands between the ages of 15 and 65 with a subsistence income.
Coverage of the public pension is close to universal, since uninterrupted residence in
the country is the only criterion (benefits are cut by 2% for each year spent abroad).2
The level of the public pension is set with reference to the minimum wage. Since
public pensions only provide a minimum income, almost all employees accumulate
additional entitlements in occupational pensions (the second pillar). Such arrange-
ments cover 90% of all employees and are usually organised at the level of the sector or
of the company (Bovenberg and Meijdam, 2001). Participation in the first two pillars is
mandatory and together they replace, on average, 70% of the gross last earned income
before retirement. This translates into replacement rates net of taxes above 80%
(Kapteyn and De Vos, 1999; Bovenberg and Meijdam, 2001). The third pillar contains
2 Technically, one accrues public pension rights if one’s income is subject to Dutch income taxes.
Residence abroad does not affect the accumulation of entitlements as long as income is taxed within the
Dutch system.
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all private savings vehicles that are aimed specifically at retirement, such as life
annuities, and these accounted for 7% of retirement income on average in the relevant
period. Such voluntary arrangements are especially important for individuals who
cannot rely on occupational pensions, such as the self employed. Finally, the
remainder of retirement income comes from the fourth pillar which contains all
other forms of wealth that can be drawn down after retirement, such as savings
accounts, investments, and real estate.
There were no major changes to the Dutch pension system between 2002 and 2013,
except for the move away from tax exempt early retirement schemes towards actuarially
fair adjustment of benefits which took place between 2000 and 2006; see Kapteyn and
De Vos (1999, 2007) and Kapteyn et al. (2010) for further descriptions of the Dutch
pension system during the period covered by our study.
De Bresser and Knoef (2015) use responses to the retirement needs module in the
LISS panel (our treatment) combined with the administrative wealth data we used in
this study and other data to analyse whether the Dutch pension system succeeded in
providing an adequate retirement income to its contributors around the time of our
study. They compare projected annuities from pensions and non-pension savings with
the self-reported minimal and desired expenditure levels from the retirement needs
module. Respondents report rather high minimum expenditure requirements, on
average 50% higher than the highest official poverty line of Statistics Netherlands.
Nevertheless, a majority of close to 70% can still expect to exceed their own minimum
expenditure level using their funds in the first two pillars of the system. The extent of
over-saving is substantial: the median difference relative to what would be required to
maintain the self-reported minimum expenditure floor is 25% taking only the first two
pillars of the retirement saving system into account; and this rises to 36% if the authors
take non-pension, non-housing savings into account. Moreover, the median difference
between the annuity from pensions and non-housing wealth and the self-reported
desired expenditure level is 18%. Thus it seems that at the time the retirement module
was fielded in LISS (in 2008), a large fraction of the population could significantly
reduce their savings and still meet their post-retirement expenditure goals.
Another important aspect of the institutional context of our study is that beginning
in 2008, individuals could find detailed information on their personal pension
entitlements in their uniform pension overview (UPO). These UPOs provide all
members of pension funds, in both the second and third pillars, with yearly updates on
their current entitlements and projected future entitlements at age 65. UPOs have
been mandatory for all financial institutions in the Netherlands since 1 January 2008.
2. Data and Research Design
Our analysis is based on the Dutch LISS Panel, a population-representative Internet
panel survey of households that has been conducted in the Netherlands since 2007.
Members of the LISS Panel complete online surveys on a regular basis. These surveys
collect data on a range of core demographic, financial, health and social topics. The
LISS has two features that are crucial to our study.
First, eligible respondents are selected randomly to be asked to complete additional,
non-core survey modules. These modules are typically designed and submitted by
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researchers and fielded only once. Researchers can specify a subset of the LISS panel as
eligible for their module. Researchers’ required sample size often does not exhaust the
full subset of those eligible, so costs are reduced by randomly choosing eligible panel
members to be asked to complete the module. The treatment we study is a module of
questions on expected needs in retirement and preferences for current versus retirement
consumption (henceforth, the ‘retirement needs module’). This module was fielded in
January 2008 and it was the first randomly assigned module in the LISS Panel.
Second, we can measure household saving through linkage to records in the Dutch
national tax record system between 2007 and 2009. This system records detailed
information on assets and debt across different asset classes at the beginning of the
calendar year. We are thus able to construct a very accurate measure of saving for 2008
and 2007: the years immediately after and before treatment. Critically, an independent
measure of saving is necessary to be sure that observed effects represent genuine
behavioural change and not changes in survey reporting style.
Details of these data sources and our research design are as follows.
2.1. The LISS Panel
The LISS Panel is a representative random sample from the Dutch population that was
initiated during the autumn of 2007. The LISS Panel is administered by CentERdata, a
survey research institute affiliated with Tilburg University, and follows close to 8,000
individuals from 5,000 households. Surveys are administered over the Internet.
Though the Netherlands has a high rate of Internet access (more than 80% of Dutch
households are connected), CentERdata safeguards representativeness by providing
sample households with an Internet subscription and a simple computer when
necessary. Scherpenzeel (2011) provides details on the design and sample.
2.2. Treatment
We define treatment as participation in the first randomly assigned module in the LISS
Panel – the retirement needs module. This module, formally titled ‘What is an
adequate old age income?’ was designed to study preferences and attitudes relating to
living standards in retirement. The module was first fielded in an older Internet panel
(the CentERpanel) and the resulting data are analysed in Binswanger and Schunk
(2012). The module was then fielded in the LISS panel in January 2008. Binswanger
et al. (2013) then compare responses to the module across the two panels to study
differences in responses between experienced (CentERpanel) and novice (LISS)
respondents. They find greater non-response among novice respondents but little
difference between experienced and novice panel members conditional on response.
Note that the survey effects they study are very different from the effects studied in this
article. They compare novice and experienced panel members, all of whom receive the
retirement needs module, to estimate the effect of past experience with an Internet
panel on survey responses (particularly responses to this module). We compare novice
panel members who received the retirement needs module to novice panel members
who did not, in order to estimate the effect of receiving this module on actual savings
behaviour (measured independently of the survey).
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It is important to emphasise that all the subjects we study were novice panel
members, and none had previously been exposed to randomised survey content.
Eligible panel members who were not offered the retirement needs module were not
offered another module. Moreover random assignment to the retirement needs
module was independent of assignment to all subsequent modules. Thus, the effect we
study is receiving the module versus not receiving it and not a comparison between this
module and some other module, or sequence of modules.
Eligibility for the survey was limited to all LISS members that were 25 years or older,
who had a net household income of at least 800 euro per month and who were either
the head of the household or his/her partner (children or other household members
were excluded from participation). This lead to a total eligible sample of 5,435
individuals, 2,755 of which were selected at random and were offered the retirement
needs module. Multiple members of a household can be members of the LISS panel,
and so households may contain zero, one or two eligible individuals. The 5,435 eligible
individuals were members of 3,125 households.
The basic unit of our analysis is the household since, as elaborated below, we
measure both wealth and income at the household level. We classify a household as
eligible if it contained at least one eligible individual, and we define a household as
‘offered’ if at least one household member that was eligible for the retirement needs
module received the request to participate. Similarly, we define a household as treated
if at least one household member was offered the module and actually completed the
module. The completion rate among those who received the offer was 74% at the
individual level and 79% at the household level.
The retirement needs module consists of around 60 items that concern desired
expenditure levels in retirement, the trade-off between current and future consump-
tion, and risk attitudes with respect to income after retirement.
• The module starts by asking how much respondents have thought about
retirement and whether they would be willing to cut down on housing
expenditures when they stop working.
• The next two questions elicit expectations with regard to the evolution of
housing costs during the first decade following retirement: the general
direction, decrease/roughly equal/increase, followed by the expected change
in euro per year.
• After having been primed in this way to consider housing as an important, and
potentially changing, category of expenditures, respondents are asked what
the minimum expenditure level is that they would never want to fall below
during retirement. Respondents then compare this minimal expenditure level
with their current expenditures and indicate the reasoning behind their
answer (e.g. summing projected expenditures in different categories or taking
a certain fraction of current income or expenditures).
• After reporting their minimal expenditures during retirement, a series of
multiple choice questions elicits desired expenditures by means of choices
between different expenditure paths during working life and retirement.
• The questions on desired expenditure levels are followed by a series of choices
between lotteries that involve income streams during retirement, to measure
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(domain-specific) risk preferences, and a vignette question in which respon-
dents indicate whether they agree that one hypothetical lifetime expenditure
path is preferable to another.
• Finally, respondents are asked a question about their willingness to pay for
prevention of climate change and they evaluate how difficult they found the
questionnaire.
The exact wording of the questions can be found in Binswanger and Schunk (2012).
Importantly, the module neither provided respondents with any information about
the Dutch system of retirement income provision in general, nor about respondents’
personal entitlements in particular. Thus, the randomised survey module did not
constitute an information shock. Since the survey did not include any questions on
predicted or intended savings either, the randomised survey module could not induce
a question-behaviour effect; respondents were not asked to predict their own
behaviour.
2.3. Saving Measures
We investigate the effect of survey participation on household saving. Though the LISS
data include elaborate biannual surveys on assets and debt, we construct our saving
measure from matched administrative data on wealth for two reasons. First, we want to
isolate effects of survey participation on economic behaviour. If we found an effect of
survey participation on self-reported savings, this could reflect altered survey-reporting
styles rather than altered economic behaviour. Deriving our outcome measures from
administrative data eliminates that concern. Second, there is a general concern about
the quality of self-reported survey data on assets (Bound et al., 2001).
The administrative wealth data we use are taken from the Complete Asset Data of the
Netherlands (Integraal Vermogensbestand, CAD), which was constructed by Statistics
Netherlands. The CAD is based on tax records, which are supplemented with
information from banks. The CAD contains a detailed decomposition of household-
level wealth for the entire Dutch population. It measures assets on the first of January
for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 (data for more recent years are not yet released at
the time of writing). Available records thus allow us to compute yearly savings during
2007 and 2008 as the differences between wealth stocks on 1 January of consecutive
years. Note that the timing is ideal for measuring the effect of a module fielded in
January of 2008. We compute these wealth stocks net of the value of the primary
residence, because we want to focus on pure savings and housing has an important
consumption component. The use of administrative data on changes in wealth to
measure savings and consumption is becoming more common; see Browning et al.
(2013) for a recent example and Browning et al. (2014) for a brief survey of the
advantages and disadvantages of such data.
Many studies of household savings behaviour are limited by having only data on
specific assets or accounts.3 Thus, changes in contributions may represent portfolio
3 For example, in Duflo et al. (2006), Karlan et al. (2012), and in many studies of individual retirement
accounts, the outcome variables are contributions to one account; see Crossley et al. (2012) for a discussion.
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reshuffling rather than changes in net saving. In contrast, a strength of our data is that
we observe an almost complete measure of wealth. The categories of assets that we
observe are checking and saving accounts, bonds, stocks, property, other real estate,
business capital and other tangibles. For debt, the CAD distinguishes between
mortgage and other debt. We miss savings held in small accounts because banks are
not obliged to report accounts with a balance of <500 euro or <15 euro in interest
payments. We also do not observe debt for households without capital income. Finally,
we miss savings held in tax-exempt private retirement (‘third pillar’) pensions. Such
accounts are taxed only during the payout phase and are therefore invisible in tax
records up to retirement. However, they were not very important during the period we
study, since annuities contributed only 7% of household retirement income (Boven-
berg and Meijdam, 2001). While we do not observe holdings in such accounts in the
administrative data, we do have information from the LISS assets survey (one of the
core surveys that is answered by all panel households). Thus, we do have a check on
changes in saving in these accounts.
In our analysis of savings, we look both at levels, in euro per year, and rates, which
are levels divided by yearly disposable income. The data on the yearly disposable
income of households are also taken from tax records. We use the Complete
Household Income Data of the Netherlands (Integraal Huishoudens Inkomstenbe-
stand, CHID), assembled by Statistics Netherlands. The measure for primary income in
the CHID is quite complete: in addition to labour income it includes income from
entrepreneurship and from assets (interest payments and imputed rent for home-
owners). Disposable income is defined as primary income plus government transfers
that the household received minus the transfers and taxes paid by the household. The
administrative income measure that we use is likely to be more accurate than survey
measures of income since information about the various income streams is provided
electronically by employers and financial institutions to the tax authority.
2.4. Matching Survey and Administrative Data and Sample Selection
The construction of our estimation sample starts with 3,125 households that contain at
least one member that was eligible for the retirement needs module according to the
criteria mentioned in Section 2. Incomplete linkage is often an important concern
when combining survey and administrative data. Out of the 3,125 households that
contain at least one member that was eligible for the retirement needs module, we
could find administrative data matches for only 1,602. Respondent refusal of consent
for matching can be a reason for incomplete linkage (Sakshaug et al., 2012) but in our
case panel attrition is a bigger problem. Informed consent for the match of LISS data
with administrative records was elicited only in September of 2011, almost four years
after the retirement needs module was fielded, and by this time many of the
households who were eligible for the retirements needs module had attritted from
the panel. De Bresser and Knoef (2015) show that only 10% of the respondents to
the retirement needs module that were still in the LISS Panel in 2011 refused consent
to the administrative data linkage. After matching the LISS respondents to adminis-
trative data, we obtain wealth records for 1,429, 1,437 and 1,449 households in the
years 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively.
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We drop those households for which all eligible members were retired in 2008,
reducing the sample to 1,275 households. Even with accurately measured administra-
tive data, there can be large outliers in ratio variables. We trim all households for which
2008 savings rates relative to after-tax household income were larger than 50% in
absolute value, leaving us with an estimation sample of 999 households. We also tried
trimming the sample at savings rates larger than 75% and 100% of net household
income and found quantitatively similar results to those reported below.4
Table 1 compares our matched estimation sample to a ‘full’ eligible sample from the
LISS that excludes only households for which all eligible members were retired in 2008
(from the 3,125 eligible LISS households this produces a sample of 2,816 households).
We provide descriptive statistics for these two samples separately for couples and
singles. Couples are households in which two partners live together irrespective of their
marital status and, among couples, individual-specific attributes (such as gender and
age) are reported for the head of the household. For both couples and singles, these
samples are very similar in terms of observables.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of the Covariates
Couples Singles
Full sample (LISS) Estimation sample Full sample (LISS) Estimation sample
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Female 0.12 (0.32) 0.11 (0.32) 0.58 (0.49) 0.62 (0.49)
Age 47.4 (11.8) 46.9 (11.5) 45.4 (12.1) 44.6 (11.6)
Children 1.16 (1.15) 1.15 (1.16) 0.41 (0.81) 0.36 (0.78)
Homeowner 0.83 (0.38) 0.81 (0.40) 0.49 (0.50) 0.42 (0.50)
Marital status
Married 0.81 (0.39) 0.83 (0.38) 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.19)
Separated/divorced 0.05 (0.23) 0.04 (0.20) 0.33 (0.47) 0.38 (0.49)
Widowed 0.002 (0.04) 0.001 (0.04) 0.10 (0.30) 0.07 (0.25)
Never married 0.13 (0.34) 0.11 (0.32) 0.51 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50)
Education
Primary 0.08 (0.28) 0.08 (0.28) 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.29)
Int. secondary 0.23 (0.42) 0.25 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.26 (0.44)
Higher secondary 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.25)
Int. vocational 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.23 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43)
Higher vocational 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.28 (0.45)
University 0.11 (0.32) 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.30) 0.06 (0.25)
Most important activity
Employed 0.72 (0.45) 0.75 (0.43) 0.69 (0.46) 0.70 (0.46)
Self employed 0.11 (0.31) 0.07 (0.26) 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.28)
HH work 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.05 (0.21) 0.06 (0.23)
Retired 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.32) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Disabled 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.17) 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.25)
Other 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15) 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29)
N 2,167 (77.0%) 768 (76.9%) 649 (23.0%) 231 (23.1%)
Note. For couples all individual-specific variables refer to the head of the household.
4 These additional estimates are available on request.
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Table 2 summarises, for our matched estimation sample, administrative assets records
for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 (all in 2008 euro). The single most important category
of assets is that of the primary residence, with an average value of around 200,000 euro.
Savings accounts follow at great distance as the secondmost important type both in terms
of mean (27,000 euro) and median (13,000 euro) value. Real estate other than the
primary residence is also important but only for a small minority: the mean value is
around 7,000 euro though only 8% of the sample has any non-residential real estate. The
mean value of risky assets, stocks and bonds, drops from 7,210 euro in 2007 to 4,857 euro
in 2009 (median holdings are zero in all years). Business wealth and other wealth are the
least important categories of assets with a mean value below 1,500 euro in all years.
On average, households have about 105,000–110,000 euro in mortgage debt and
around 2,000–2,500 euro of non-mortgage debt. Non-mortgage debt is concentrated in
a small minority of 6% of the sample, among which the mean non-mortgage debt is
around 20,000 euro.
Taking assets and debt together, the mean net worth of the households in the
sample is around 135,000 euro. Not surprisingly, net worth is concentrated in the
primary residence, which has a mean value net of mortgage of around 95,000 euro.
Because of the consumption value of housing, we compute savings based on the
remaining 40,000 euro of non-housing savings.
2.5. Threats to Validity
Our analysis faces three threats to internal validity. Figure 1 provides an overview of the
issues.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of the Assets and Debt Variables
2007 2008 2009
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Assets
Saving accounts 25,551 12,799 40,870 26,728 12,728 42,568 28,008 13,196 44,963
Risky assets 7,210 0 23,974 6,627 0 22,560 4,857 0 17,468
Property 196,713 205,571 162,020 201,325 212,589 161,463 199,616 212,181 155,063
Real estate 9,808 0 53,750 6,906 0 41,722 7,689 0 44,442
Business 1,202 0 12,588 1,212 0 13,842 1,459 0 15,485
Other 861 0 9,914 959 0 10,871 1,014 0 10,779
Debt
Mortgage 105,119 86,091 105,553 104,079 84,827 103,787 108,243 91,412 106,892
Non-mortgage
debt
2,375 0 13,796 1,992 0 12,621 2,432 0 18,823
Net worth 133,852 78,760 172,072 137,687 81,551 170,305 131,968 77,021 167,938
Net housing
wealth
91,594 40,984 131,904 97,246 47,128 128,481 91,374 43,949 124,627
Net worth excl.
housing
42,258 16,292 82,970 40,440 15,643 76,797 40,594 15,232 77,325
N 983 999 999
Note. All assets and debt are reported in 2008 euros.
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The first threat is that the randomisation of the offer was performed at the level of
the individual while the outcome variables we analyse are measured at the household
level. We classify a household as being offered the survey if at least one eligible member
received the offer, so by construction households with multiple eligible members are
more likely to receive the offer. Thus we have conditionally random allocation to
treatment and control: conditional on the number of eligible household members,
randomisation across individuals ensures that the offer is random at the household
level. Therefore in all of the regressions reported in the next Section, we control for
the presence of multiple household members. As in practice, eligible households have
either one or two eligible members, this amounts to including in our regression
models a dummy variable equal to one if the household has a second eligible member.
We checked the conditional random allocation of households to treatment and
control by regressing our instrument (an indicator for being offered the retirement
needs module), on all the socio-demographic variables listed in Table 1 while
controlling for the presence of multiple eligibles in the household. As expected, the
dummy for multiple eligibles does predict receipt of offer at the household level.
However, conditional on this control, the other covariates are jointly insignificant
(p = 0.901). One-by-one balance tests also confirm that treatment and control groups
are similar in terms of demographics, with no statistically or economically significant
differences. Hence, the covariates are (conditionally) balanced, as one would expect
given the conditional randomisation.
The second issue is incomplete compliance with the offer of treatment: not every
LISS Panel member who was offered the retirement needs module completed this
module. We apply two remedies. First, we perform an intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis
Eligible individuals
Offered
individuals
Not offered
individuals
Offered
households
Eligible, but not
offered
households
Noncompliant
households
Treated
households
Random
Outcomes
Not
Observed
Outcomes
Not
Observed
Outcomes
Not
Observed
Outcomes
Observed
Outcomes
Observed
Outcomes
Observed
Conditionally random
Fig. 1. Overview of the Research Design
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that compares those who did receive the offer with those who did not (instead of
comparing those who were treated with those who were not). Second, we perform
instrumental variables (IV) analyses in which we use the (conditionally) random offer
of treatment as an instrument for being treated. Both methods allow us to obtain
estimates of treatment effects that are not affected by endogenous sample selection as
a result of non-compliance, since they rely on exogenous variation in the module
offer.5
Our intention to treat analysis, exploiting the conditionally random allocation of
eligible households to the offer of the retirement needs module, is implemented by
estimating the following regression:
Sh;t ¼ b0 þ b1IMEh þ b2Zh þ eh;t ; (1)
where Sh;t is the saving (level or rate) of household h at time t; IMEh is an indicator
variable for the presence of multiple eligible individuals in the household and Zh is our
instrument, which is equal to one if one of those eligible in the household received the
offer of the retirement-needs-module. The parameter b2 is the ITT effect.
Our estimate of the treatment effect is obtained by estimating the equation:
Sh;t ¼ a0 þ a1IMEh þ a2Th þ uh;t ; (2)
where Th is the treatment dummy, equal to one if at least one of those eligible in the
household received the offer of the retirement needs module and completed the
module. We estimate this equation by instrumental variables with Zh as the instrument
for Th. The parameter a2 is the treatment effect. Importantly, the research design we
use is characterised by one-sided non-compliance: those respondents who were not
randomly selected for the offer of the module could not complete the module. Thus,
the monotonicity requirement for the identification of local average treatment effects
(Angrist et al., 1996) is satisfied.
In addition to IV regressions for the conditional mean of the savings distribution, we
also estimate decile treatment effects in order to establish the robustness of our results.
We use the estimator proposed in Fr€olich and Melly (2013).6
The final threat to internal validity is the incomplete matching to the administrative
data, described above. This would invalidate our design if, among those eligible, selection
into our estimation sample were related to the offer of the retirements needs survey (i.e. if
selection were related to our instrument). It is important to check whether this is the case.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the estimated sample is quite like the full
sample of those eligible in terms of observables characteristics. However, one difference
between the full sample and the estimation sample that is not reported in Table 1 is the
degree of compliance with the survey offer. As noted above, in the full sample, 74% of
individuals who were offered the survey participated. Household-level compliance in the
full sample is 5 percentage points higher at 79%.7 In the estimation sample, the
5 This randomised assignment to a treatment and control group at a given point in time allows us to
identify the effect of the survey on behaviour. Other research questions could be answered using different
randomisations, such as randomised inclusion into a panel at different times in order to measure panel
conditioning.
6 The Stata code we used for implementing this estimator is discussed in Fr€olich and Melly (2010).
7 Again, this is because some households have two eligible individuals who both received an offer and if
either completes the survey we consider the household to be treated.
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corresponding compliance rates are 82% for individuals and 87% for households. It is not
surprising that compliance with the offer of the retirement needs module is related to
inclusion in the estimation sample.Non-compliers with the surveyoffer are alsomore likely
to leave theLISSPanel altogether.As a result,non-complierswere less likely tobepresent in
2011 to give consent for the match to administrative records. However, this does not
compromise our research design, so long as the instrument is orthogonal to this selection
process.
In the next Section, we formally test whether selection into the estimation sample is
(mean) independent of the instrument. We do this by estimating the following
regression on the full sample of eligible households:
IESh ¼ c0 þ c1IMEh þ c2Zh þ vh ; (3)
where IESh is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the household is included in
the estimation sample. The hypothesis that inclusion in the sample is independent of
the instrument implies c2 ¼ 0, and this is our test.
3. Results
3.1. Outcomes: Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics for net income and for the outcome variables
(savings and saving rates) used in the analysis. Statistics are presented for 2007 and
2008, and the matched estimation sample of eligible households is split into those
offered and not offered the module which is our treatment (i.e. values of our binary
instrumental variable). In 2008 mean household income is 36,479 euro for the not-
offered group and 38,979 for the offered group. Both values are slightly higher than
the average of 33,100 euro for the Dutch population at large (Centraal Bureau voor de
Statistiek (CBS), 2012). This is unsurprising given that conditions for eligibility for the
module included a minimum income. The difference in mean incomes between the
not-offered and offered groups reflects the fact that random assignment of the module
to those eligible occurred at the level of the individual respondent, as described in the
previous Section. This means that households with multiple eligible members were
more likely to be offered and so offered households are more likely to have multiple
eligible members. Table 3 reveals that in 2008, 82% of offered households contained
multiple eligible individuals while only 62% of not-offered households contained
multiple eligible individuals. These differences, and the resulting income differences,
emphasise again that, at the household level, we have conditional random assignment
to the offer of the module (conditional on the number of eligible individuals in the
household). As explained in the previous Section, our empirical strategy accounts
for this.
In 2007, the mean level of savings among eligible households who were subsequently
offered the module was 1,207 euros, with a median of 1.6 euro. This is non-housing
saving, computed as the difference between the non-housing wealth stocks of 1 January
2007 and 2008. For eligible households that were subsequently offered the module,
mean savings were 1,247 euro, with a median of 184 euro. Note that the savings levels
are very dispersed, with the standard deviation in both groups about 9,000 euro. In the
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same year, the mean savings rates were 2.3% for the not-offered and 1.7% for the
offered. We compute savings rates as the level of savings divided by after-tax income.
The medians are respectively 0% and 1%. As with saving levels, savings rates are very
dispersed with a standard deviation of 18 percentage points in both groups.
In 2008, the mean saving rate of the not-offered group fell somewhat, to 1.6%. The
mean saving rate of the offered group fell much more, from 1.7% to (1.6)% (a fall of
3.1 percentage points). This suggests that the participation in the module may have
had an effect on the saving behaviour of the 79% of the offered group that did
participate. Note, however, that the saving rate of the offered group in 2007 does not
provide a credible counterfactual for the saving rate of that group in 2008 (because of
time effects). The saving rate of the non-offered group in 2008 also does not provide a
credible counterfactual for the saving rate of the offered in 2008 (because the groups
differ in the frequency of households with multiple eligible individuals). We now turn
to the ITT and IV estimators that provide a credible counterfactual and therefore
credible estimates of the causal effect of participation in the module.
Table 3
Outcomes: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD P25 P50 P75
Panel (a) 2007
Not offered
HH income* 35,916 19,130 22,810 33,486 43,201
Level of savings† 1,271 8,854 1,627 1,594 3,770
Savings rate 0.023 0.176 0.054 0.000 0.110
Hholds w. multiple eligibles 0.58
N 330
Offered
HH income* 39,624 18,619 28,780 36,761 47,020
Level of savings† 1,247 9,325 2,295 184 4,270
Savings rate 0.017 0.178 0.067 0.005 0.114
Hholds w. multiple eligibles 0.82
N 684
Panel (b) 2008
Not offered
HH income* 36,479 19,320 24,241 33,940 44,169
Level of savings† 1,105 9,513 2,044 352 3,422
Savings rate 0.016 0.175 0.062 0.010 0.108
Hholds w. multiple eligibles 0.62
N 325
Offered
HH income* 38,978 16,739 28,223 36,787 46,661
Level of savings† 305 9,334 3,857 0.000 2,823
Savings rate 0.016 0.199 0.112 0.000 0.082
Hholds w. multiple eligibles 0.82
Module participation 0.79
N 674
Notes. *HH income net of taxes. †Savings corrected for inflation and net of property value and mortgages. All
monetary variables in 2008 euros.
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3.2. Validity and Relevance of the Instrument
As explained in Section 4, we lose about half of our sample when we match LISS
Panel records with administrative data. This loss of data would compromise the
internal validity of our empirical strategy if the matching of the LISS Panel observations
with the administrative data were related to the instrument, the offer of the retirement
needs module. Table 4 shows estimates of (3). This a linear regression that uses
our instrument, called ‘offer’, and a dummy for households with multiple eligible
individuals, to explain an indicator of inclusion in the estimation sample. We find that
sample selection is not correlated with the offer of the retirement needs module, so the
loss of data that results from matching survey participants to administrative data does
not invalidate our research design.
Turning to instrument relevance, the first-stage regression reported in Table 5
demonstrates that the instrument is highly relevant: the F-statistic for the coefficient of
the instrument in a model that controls for the presence of multiple eligible
individuals is 4,818.37.
Table 4
Exogeneity of the Instrument w.r.t. Data Linkage
Dependent variable: indicator for estimation sample
Offered 0.0209
(0.0201)
Multiple eligibles 0.00700
(0.0215)
Constant 0.364***
(0.0207)
Number of selected HHs 999
N 2,816
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Table 5
First Stage
Dependent variable: HH treated
HH offered 0.879***
(0.0127)
Multiple eligibles 0.0376**
(0.0159)
Constant 0.0231**
(0.00988)
R2 0.688
F(1, 996) 4,818.37***
N 999
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Together these two tables confirm that our empirical strategy overcomes both
incomplete matching of households to the administrative wealth data and non-
compliance with the offer of module participation.
3.3. Main Results
Table 6 presents ITT estimates of the effect of (the offer of) survey participation on
household saving, both for the mean and at various quantiles. The top panel uses 2008
non-housing savings as the outcome variable, while the bottom panel explains the 2008
savings rate (non-housing savings dividedbyhousehold income). In themean regression,
we find a reduction in the savings rate of 3.1 percentage points, or about 1,500 euro of
2008 non-housing savings. The estimated saving rates effects at various deciles are of
the same order of magnitude as themean effect, between 2 and 5 percentage points.
These ITT estimates, in conjunction with the summary statistics in Table 3, allow us
to calculate counterfactual savings levels and rates for the offered group in 2008. In
particular, subtracting the ITT estimate of (3.1) percentage points from the observed
saving rate of (0.016) gives a counterfactual saving rate of 1.5% for the offered group
in 2008. An analogous calculation gives a counterfactual saving level of 1,173.
Table 7 presents our main results, obtained from IV regressions of the two savings
measures (levels and rates) on participation in the retirement needs module, where we
instrument survey participation with the random offer of the survey and control for
multiple eligibles in the household. The leftmost column shows the estimated
coefficients and accompanying standard errors for the treatment dummy in 2SLS
models, which capture the mean effect. Participation in the survey caused households
to save 1,683 euro less on average during 2008. This is a large effect, and can be
compared to the counterfactual saving of the offered group of 1,173 euro.
When we express savings relative to household income, we also find a significant and
negative effect. Survey participation caused households to save 3.5 percentage points
Table 6
The Effect of Survey Participation on Savings (ITT Effects)
Mean
Deciles†
0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
Dependent variable: 2008 non-housing savings (thousands of euro)
Offered 1.478** 1.502 0.956** 0.581 0.499 0.697* 0.968** 0.791
(0.672) (1.011) (0.475) (0.373) (0.357) (0.382) (0.459) (0.685)
Sample
statistics
0.154 4.935 2.061 0.583 0.002 1.060 2.245 4.393
N 999
Dependent variable: 2008 non-housing savings rate (1 = 100%)
Offered 0.0308** 0.0495* 0.0256* 0.0197* 0.0113 0.0233** 0.0243* 0.0312
(0.0127) (0.0258) (0.0148) (0.0112) (0.0107) (0.0113) (0.0131) (0.0196)
Sample
statistics
0.01 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.13
N 999
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. †For
decile models we report unconditional treatment effects. We control for the presence of multiple eligibles.
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less on average, compared with counterfactual mean saving rate of 1.5% and a standard
deviation of 18 percentage points (both for the offered group). On average,
participation in the survey moved households from modest saving to modest dis-saving.
The remaining columns of Table 7 report quantile IV effects. We report estimates
for the second to eighth deciles in order to show that participation in the retirement
needs module affected subsequent savings throughout the distribution of savings rates.
For the level of savings, we find significant and large effects for the third, sixth and
seventh deciles. The estimated coefficients for the other deciles are also all negative.
For the saving rate, we find strongly significant effects at the third and sixth deciles as
well as marginally significant effects at the second and fourth deciles. These estimates
show that large parts of the savings distribution were shifted by participation in the
survey, with similar effect sizes below and above the median. The mean effects reported
above are not driven by responses in the tails of the saving distribution.
We investigated the robustness of these results in a number of other ways as well. In
particular, alternative trimming rules yield quantitatively similar results, as do narrower
definitions of wealth that include only risky assets and bank accounts.8
Our identification is based on the randomised offer of the retirement needs module
to a subset of the eligible panel members. This implies conditional randomisation to
households (conditional on the number of eligibles in a household) and allows us to
cleanly measure the causal effect of interest. Nevertheless, we added to the models
Table 7
The Effect of Survey Participation on Savings (IV Treatment Effects)
Mean
Deciles†
0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
Dependent variable: 2008 non-housing savings (thousands of euro)
Treated 1.683** 1.792 1.193** 0.644 0.474 0.955** 1.085** 0.784
(0.764) (1.119) (0.552) (0.458) (0.438) (0.461) (0.530) (0.709)
Sample
statistics
0.154 4.935 2.061 0.583 0.002 1.060 2.245 4.393
Proportion
compliers
0.875
N 999
Dependent variable: 2008 non-housing savings rate (1 = 100%)
Treated 0.0351** 0.0519* 0.0337** 0.0224* 0.00922 0.0352** 0.0247 0.0317
(0.0144) (0.0286) (0.0166) (0.0135) (0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0153) (0.0208)
Sample
statistics
0.01 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.13
Proportion
compliers
0.875
N 999
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. †For
decile models, we report unconditional treatment effects. We control for the presence of multiple eligibles.
8 Assets held in bank accounts and risky investments are provided directly by banks to the tax authority and
as a result are probably measured most accurately. Therefore, we also tried yearly savings in those categories
as alternative outcome variables. Estimates are available on request.
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reported in Table 7 all the covariates listed in Table 1 and found that all effects are
robust to including these additional controls.9
3.4. Falsification Test
As a falsification test, we estimate the same IV model from (2) with 2007 savings as the
dependent variable, that is on behaviour realised before exposure to the retirement
needsmodule. The results of this exercise are reported inTable 8.Wefindno evidence of
any systematic difference in savings behaviour, neither in terms of the mean level or rate
of saving, nor at any of the deciles. Note that, in contrast to Table 7, the coefficients of the
various deciles vary in sign. This provides further assurance that our research design is
valid and that our main results are not driven by incomplete data linkage (as any
differential selection into the match sample would also affect the 2007 results).
3.5. Effect Heterogeneity
We next investigate effect heterogeneity. One approach would be to run IV analyses on
subsamples but many variables that could be used for interesting splits of the sample
are correlated. Examples are income and education, or income and age. Therefore, we
prefer a pooled IV approach, in which we interact the treatment (survey participation)
dummy with household characteristics, and then generate additional instruments by
interacting our instrument (the offer dummy) with household characteristics. In
addition to the interaction between selected covariates and the treatment dummy, the
estimated model includes all the covariates from Table 1 as exogenous independent
variables. We investigate heterogeneity along the lines of income, education and age.
Table 8
Falsification Tests (IV Treatment Effects)
Mean
Deciles†
0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
Dependent variable: 2007 non-housing savings (thousands of euro)
Treated 0.406 0.582 0.130 0.158 0.090 0.393 0.684 1.792
(0.749) (0.889) (0.460) (0.414) (0.417) (0.478) (0.832) (1.251)
Proportion
compliers
0.866
N 1,014
Dependent variable: 2007 non-housing savings rate (1 = 100%)
Treated 0.0136 0.00961 0.00279 0.00197 0.00198 0.00296 0.0211 0.0257
(0.0147) (0.0249) (0.0133) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0136) (0.0218) (0.0298)
Proportion
compliers
0.866
N 1,014
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. †For
decile models, we report unconditional treatment effects. We control for the presence of multiple eligibles.
9 Estimates available on request.
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Note that, for reasons of sample size, the specification does not contain dummies for
all cells defined by those variables but only interactions of the separate variables with
the treatment indicator.
The upper panel of Table 9 displays coefficient estimates for the main effect and
interaction terms of the model with the savings rate as the dependent variable.
According to these estimates, the survey did not affect the average savings rate of the
base group: young, income-poor households that are poorly educated. We find strong
evidence for differential effects along the age and education dimensions: households
with more highly educated or older heads reduced their savings more after having
been offered the retirement needs module. The evidence for effect heterogeneity by
current income is weaker. Once we allow the treatment effect to interact with
education, the interaction with income is positive (indicating that, conditional on
education, households with higher current income cut saving by less). But the income
interaction is only weakly statistically significant (p < 0.1) and much smaller in
magnitude than the interaction with higher education. It may be that education is a
better measure of long-run economic position or retirement preparedness.
Table 9
Heterogeneous IV Treatment Effects – Savings Rate
Dependent variable: 2008 savings rate (1 = 100%)
Treated 0.0283
(0.0347)
Treated 9 HH inc. high 0.0526*
(0.0301)
Treated 9 educ. middle 0.0172
(0.0363)
Treated 9 educ. high 0.115***
(0.0355)
Treated 9 age 40-54 0.0249
(0.0337)
Treated 9 age 55+ 0.0838**
(0.0380)
Controls Yes
R2 0.0586
N 999
Heterogeneous effects
Income below median Income above median
Education Education
Low Middle High Low Middle High
Age <40 0.0283 0.0112 0.0862*** 0.0809* 0.0637* 0.0336
(0.0347) (0.0305) (0.0323) (0.0427) (0.0355) (0.0337)
Age 40–54 0.00348 0.0137 0.111*** 0.0560 0.0389 0.0585*
(0.0337) (0.0349) (0.0367) (0.0351) (0.0319) (0.0301)
Age 55+ 0.0555* 0.0727* 0.170*** 0.00293 0.0201 0.117***
(0.0308) (0.0395) (0.0385) (0.0387) (0.0426) (0.0388)
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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We then use the coefficients of this model to calculate treatment effects for
households with different combinations of characteristics. These are reported in the
lower panel of Table 9. Participation actually raised the saving rate of households with
poorly educated heads who are younger than 40 and have a disposable income above
the sample median by 8 percentage points (though this effect is not particularly
precise). Households in the highest education category saved less regardless of the age
of the head and their household income but we find the strongest effects for older
households: the mean treatment effect is 3/9 percentage points for households
below age 40; 5/11 percentage points for age 40–54; and 12/17 percentage
points for households aged 55 or older. We find similar heterogeneity in the survey
effect on the level of savings.10
Overall, Table 9 shows that the size of the effect of survey participation on saving is
much larger for the highly educated (college and university graduates). In addition, we
also investigated effect heterogeneity by gender and family type, and whether the
number of household members participating matters. In particular, we checked
whether the effect differs depending on whether the individual(-s) who received the
offer is a husband; a wife; both husband and wife; a single male; or a single female.
However, with our sample size, we are unable to discern differential effects depending
on whether men or women were offered the survey, or whether one or two household
members were offered the survey. These estimates are available on request.
Next we further explored potential sources of the significant effect heterogeneity
across education groups. The various estimates underlying the results discussed below
are not presented in the Tables but, again, are available on request.
Households in the highest education group have higher rates of home ownership.
They also have higher pension wealth in terms of a standardised annuity from the first
two (mandatory) pillars of the pension system: the median predicted annuity, net of
taxes, is 1,442 euro/month for poorly educated households, compared with 1,725 and
2,039 euro/month respectively for the higher education groups. However, the
replacement rate of the projected annuity relative to current income is similar for
all education groups, ranging from 79% to 81%. Conditional on education, neither
home ownership nor either measure of pension wealth further significantly interacts
with the treatment effect. This suggests that differences in financial circumstances may
not drive the heterogeneity in treatment effects across education groups.
An alternative hypothesis is that the education groups differ in the way the survey
affects attention to retirement saving and needs. However, there is no significant
difference in their reported rates of thinking about retirement prior to the survey. The
high education group answer the survey more quickly than the low education group
(median difference two minutes, p = 0.058) but the difference between the high
education and middle income groups is not statistically significant. Moreover, we find
no significant interaction between treatment effect and survey response time.
A question in the retirement needs module elicited subjects’ expectations of housing
costs in retirement. Interestingly, relative to low education households, highly educated
households are much more likely to expect a decrease in housing costs after retirement.
10 Estimates available on request.
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These differences are economically and statistically significant (p < 0.001). Unfortu-
nately, as this question was asked in the retirement needs module, i.e. only of the
treated sample, we cannot test for treatment effect heterogeneity in this specific
dimension. Nevertheless, this difference raises the possibility that the survey made
salient to high education households likely decreases in housing expenditure after
retirement.
3.6. Evidence on Portfolio Effects
Finally, we consider whether the observed effect of survey participation on household
saving might reflect portfolio reshuffling rather changes in active saving. There are two
concerns. First, as explained earlier, the administrative wealth data do not contain
information on a relatively small category of tax-favoured savings accounts. Though
these are not a major asset category in the Netherlands, it remains possible that our
findings of a negative effect of survey participation on non-housing savings results from
a re-allocation of assets to those accounts. Second, our wealth-based measure of saving
contains both active saving and capital gains. A possibility is that treated households
shifted saving to risky assets and then experienced significant losses with the onset of
the financial crisis in 2008. Changes in active saving and changes in portfolio allocation
would both be a survey effect but it is important and interesting to distinguish the
nature of the effect.
With respect to the first point, we used survey data from the LISS assets module to
look at investments in these tax-favoured saving accounts. We tested for survey effects
on accounts on both extensive and intensive margins. We find no effect on
participation in such accounts, change in participation, balances conditional on
participation or unconditional balances.11 While the survey data may be quite noisy at
the intensive margin, we believe the participation is relatively well-measured. Turning
to the second point, we use the administrative wealth data to test for an effect of survey
participation on the portfolio share of risky assets, participation in risky assets, or
changes in either shares or participation.12 We do not find any evidence to suggest that
capital gains for risky assets drive the survey effects that we document. Moreover, we
also find survey effects when we limit our attention to changes in the balance of saving
accounts, an asset class that does not exhibit large price-driven variation in value. These
checks point to the effect documented above being an effect on active saving, and not
an effect on portfolio allocation.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, we show that participating in a non-informative survey module on
retirement needs led Dutch households to save significantly less. Our analysis uses
administrative wealth data to calculate clean measures of savings that are not
contaminated by the reporting styles of survey respondents, which themselves might
11 In all these regressions, we find p > 0.3 for the effect of the treatment dummy; estimates are available on
request.
12 Estimates are available on request.
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have been affected by the intervention. Participation in the survey is instrumented by
randomised assignment of invitations to participate in the module, so our estimates are
unaffected by endogenous compliance. Estimated effects are large: the saving rate
(saving as a fraction of disposable income) is 3.5 percentage points lower among
treated households (on a base saving rate of 1.5%). Our wealth data only allow us to
compute savings during 2007 and 2008. Naturally we will investigate the durability of
the effects when more data become available.
Quantile IV models show effects across a wide range of the savings distribution.
Falsification checks reveal no effect on savings prior to the survey. We find evidence for
heterogeneous treatment effects. The mean effect is driven by older and highly
educated households. These households have the highest expected pension wealth
and higher housing wealth. They are also much more likely, in the survey, to report
that their housing costs will fall in retirement (perhaps because they anticipate paying
off their mortgage debt).
Our results are consistent with limited attention (DellaVigna, 2009). The survey may
have made aspects of retirement needs and retirement planning more salient to
participants. After reflecting on their expenditure needs in retirement, older and
highly educated households concluded that they can afford to save less while the young
and poorly educated marginally increased their savings. Asymmetric costs of adjust-
ment may also be relevant. If the survey led some participants to conclude that they
were saving too much, and some to conclude they were saving too little, the former may
have found it easier to adjust. They only need to consume more.
These results are likely specific to the context of the experiment. At the time the
retirement needs module was fielded in 2008, mandatory pensions were generous,
replacing 80% of final income after tax on average, and covered nearly the entire
population. De Bresser and Knoef (2015) show that many Dutch households were over-
saving, relative to their self-reported desired expenditure level in retirement. They also
show that more educated households could look forward to higher occupational
pensions. Moreover, financial institutions were obliged to provide all pension holders
with Universal Pensions Overviews (UPOs) from 2008 onwards. This may have meant
that households whose attention was drawn to their retirement needs and plans could
obtain information on current entitlements and projections for age 65 at very low cost.
It is not clear how households would react to the salience shock of the survey if they
were largely under-saving (especially if adjustment costs are asymmetric), or if
information on retirement preparedness was costly to obtain.
While effects which are likely due to limited attention have been documented
previously (Stango and Zinman, 2014), our results highlight that such effects can
operate in surprising directions depending on the context. We also show that the
patterns of heterogeneous effects are context specific. We find the largest effects for
the most educated while Stango and Zinman (2014) find the opposite. Perhaps most
importantly, we show that such effects can operate on the most central of life-cycle
choices, such as the level of consumption and saving. These salience effects might be
exploited for purposes of pension policy. But it is only through the continued
accumulation of evidence on how salience shocks manifest in widely-varied contexts,
and with respect to different outcomes, that general models of these effects can be
formulated and convincingly tested.
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The validity of empirical research that uses survey data relies on the representative-
ness of the sample.13 Survey effects such as the one documented in this article imply
that panels may not be representative of the underlying population even if the initial
sampling was representative and the representativeness of the panel has not been
degraded by attrition or non-response. If survey participation alters the behaviour of
respondents, the external validity of any study based on such data will be
compromised. Moreover, if the behaviour of survey participants is altered by
participation, new ethical issues arise in survey research. This issue is already being
debated in the public health literature (Fitzsimons and Moore, 2008; Schwarz, 2008).
Such considerations may be a further argument for greater use of administrative data
whenever available (Einav and Levin, 2014).14 Also, as noted by Zwane et al. (2011),
survey effects may mean that it is better to achieve statistical power with large panels
and infrequent measurement rather than with smaller but more frequently measured
samples.
In their recent survey, Warren and Halpern-Manners (2012) call for more research
on panel conditioning and survey effects that employs experimental or quasi-
experimental designs, and which documents effects in the kinds of large-scale
longitudinal surveys that underpin much research in the social sciences. Our analysis
shows one way in which this can be done: by exploiting the randomisation of content
that is becoming more common in such surveys. We strongly support their call for
further research.
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